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Abstract— A significant challenge for governments around the 
globe is the need to improve the level of awareness for citizens and 
businesses about the threats that exist in cyberspace. The arrival of 
new information technologies has resulted in different types of 
criminal activities, which previously did not exist, with the potential 
to cause extensive damage. Given the fact that the Internet is 
boundary-less, it makes it difficult to identify where attacks originate 
from and how to counter them. The only solution is to improve the 
level of support for security systems and evolve the defences against 
cyber-attacks. This project supports the development of critical 
infrastructure security research, in the fight against a growing threat 
from the digital domain. However, the real-world evaluation of 
emerging security systems for Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems is impractical. The research project 
furthers the knowledge and understanding of Information Systems; 
specifically acting as a facilitator for cyber-security research. In this 
paper, the construction of a testbed and datasets for cyber-security 
and critical infrastructure research are presented.  
Index Terms—Critical Infrastructure, SCADA, Testbed, Security 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Interconnected control systems such as SCADA (Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition) monitor and govern public 
infrastructures, such as power plants and water distribution 
networks [1]. A constant assessment of the security of 
working control systems is necessary to ensure critical 
infrastructures are secured against external cyber-threats. 
However, this assessment process can impact the availability 
and performance of the control system. These types of 
environment require constant service provision and any 
disruption can be costly, and impact upon the end-users. For 
that reason, alternative approaches to assessing the security of 
automated control systems are needed.  
Non-virtualised physical testbeds are costly and 
inaccessible, and are often location constrained [1]. As such, 
modern education and research for control system security is 
becoming increasingly reliant on virtualised labs and tools [2]. 
Any learning or research undertaken using these tools, 
however, is based around the limitations and characteristics of 
such tools, as well as any assumptions made by their 
developers. Additionally, the accuracy of data resulting from 
emulations and models may be further decreased if used 
outside of their intended usage scenario. It is for that reason 
that projects such as SCADAVT propose testbed frameworks 
for cyber-security experimentation, based on a simulation 
approach [1].  
A virtualised approach offers significant cost savings and a 
self-paced and active approach to learning. However, it also 
has several key limitations including: no hands-on experience, 
no real-world training with specific equipment and no 
experience in identifying and interpreting incorrect or 
uncharacteristic data. Simulation is effective at representing 
“correct” behaviour. However, critical infrastructure systems 
need to be protected against situations where they are exposed 
to extreme abnormal events. Unfortunately, in such 
circumstances, systems do not always behave in the way 
expected or respond in the same consistent manner. Similarly, 
it is therefore difficult to accurately model how a system’s 
erratic behaviour might cascade and impact other parts of the 
infrastructure. 
The research presented in this paper provides an ideal 
solution. The practical element involved in the Micro-CI 
project introduces a level of realism that is difficult to match 
through simulation alone. It allows for the advantages of both 
physical and virtual tools to be combined, and some of these 
are discussed below. 
 Pedagogical benefits: The Micro-CI approach offers 
students and researchers hands-on experience and first-
hand knowledge of the unpredictability of a system under 
attack or stress. It will also help them to refine their 
problem solving and practical skills. 
 Cost effectiveness: The Micro-CI project has been 
designed to be as cost effective as possible. For example, 
at the time of writing, we estimate that at the time of 
writing, the design presented in this paper can be 
replicated at low cost. 
 Portability: As the project components are on a 
miniaturised bench top scale, it enables them to be packed 
away, stored and transported with ease. Projects can still 
be moved and/or stored whilst partially assembled. 
 Platform independency: The Micro-CI project does not 
require any specific requirements, dependencies or 
operating systems to interact with the testbeds developed. 
Additionally, it is not tied or restricted by any licencing 
model, so it can be used on an infinite number of different 
machines, without incurring additional costs. 
In this paper, the architecture for the Micro-CI testbed, 
which replicates a water distribution plant, is outlined. Both 
the physical design and construction of the testbed are detailed. 
A case study and evaluation, in which cyber-attacks are 
launched against the water distribution plant, are also 
presented.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 
2 presents a background discussion on testbed and critical 
infrastructure modelling. Cyber-security and cyber-threats are 
also highlighted. Section 3 presents the approach used to 
construct the Micro-CI testbed and a case study of the impact 
of an attack on the system. The resulting data is evaluated in 
Section 4. Finally, the paper is concluded and the future work 
is highlighted in Section 5. 
2.  BACKGROUND 
As automation grows in all areas of critical infrastructures [4], 
increased pressure is put on control systems to oversee and 
monitor operations at all times. A central control unit has the 
job of governing the behaviour of a vast system, ensuring the 
infrastructure is run smoothly and automated efficiently [7]. 
A. Control Systems 
Centralised control systems enable operators to control 
components from remote locations without physically needing 
to be there [5]. The requirement of operators having to travel 
to distant locations has been replaced by carefully designed 
user interfaces that allow the operator to interact with the 
system. The interfaces are often comprised of off-the-shelf 
components constructed to a specification suitable for the type 
of infrastructure being used [6]. The use of off-the-shelf 
components is a cause for concern, as the technology used in 
infrastructures is readily available for anyone to use, which 
can make them more vulnerable to attack [6]. 
A typical modern control system consists of a network of 
sensors acquiring data, which are used to control devices 
using programmable logic controllers (PLC). They are 
typically composed of three parts, the master terminal unit 
(MTU), remote terminal units (RTU) and the communication 
links. The MTU acquires data and sends instructions between 
various components such as a Human Machine Interface 
(HMI), databases for storing past information, workstations 
for engineers and business information systems for industrial 
applications. RTUs are essentially PLC devices that automate 
the actions ordered by the master terminal unit. The 
communication links are responsible for proficient 
communication and usually consist of fibre optics, microwave, 
telephone lines, pilot cables, radio or satellite. 
Figure 1 provides a simplified illustrative overview of a 
control system, whereby the RTU provides the 
communication link between various components of the 
infrastructure and the MTU, which is linked to the graphical 
user interface. 
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Figure 1 SCADA Overview 
At this stage, the SCADA system is typically software that 
enables the operator to interact with the MTU and observe the 
on-going activities in the infrastructure [10]. Other approaches 
to control system construction can include a DCS (Distributed 
Control System) layout, which tends to have no central 
controller but is operated by various control components 
working together to decide the required action [8], [9]. 
However, the Micro-CI testbed detailed in this paper follows 
the traditional centralised control system structure for the 
purposes of simplicity and replicability. 
B. The Cyber Threat 
Control system data is coded in protocol format to 
exchange information with components and RTUs. The 
protocol formats provide automation and send information 
back to the control user interface to deliver a status of system 
operations. Communication protocols are designed for real-
time operation [11]. Two examples of industrial control 
network protocols include Modbus (Modicon Communication 
Bus) and DNP3 (Distributed Network Protocol). They are 
commonly used in modern day critical infrastructures and able 
to match the specific requirements of the system. However, 
they are susceptible to disruption and security breaches [11]. 
One of the most common methods of attack is the Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, where systems are sent large 
volumes of traffic that is intended to make the system fail by 
overloading it. This attack is effective. It is a challenge to 
distinguish between good and bad requests, making attacks 
problematic to block [13]. 
Often cyber-attacks are specifically targeted at individual 
parts of infrastructures. For example, various attacks are 
designed with the precise intention of disrupting or infiltrating 
SCADA systems [12]. One such attack is known as a Process 
Network Malware Infection (PNMI), which involves injecting 
a worm into the process network. The process network is 
often used for hosting the whole of the SCADA where 
communication is conducted through protocols like ModBus 
or DNP3 [12]. Another common technique is the Man in the 
Middle attack (MITM) [14] where false commands or system 
instructions and fake responses are inserted into the system. 
Not only can a MITM attack be used to cause disruption; it 
can also be used to provide a way of eavesdropping; making it 
important to use authentication protocols to ensure the 
confidentiality and integrity of the communications [15]. 
C. Related Projects 
The growing cyber-threat has led to a switch in research 
focus from physical protection to digital infrastructure 
security measures. However, this cyber-security research is 
hampered by a lack of realistic experimental data and 
opportunities to test new theories in a real-world environment 
[16]. For that reason, projects such as SCADAVT, have 
developed simulation-based testbed, which builds upon the 
CORE emulator, for building realistic SCADA models [1].  
In their approach, Almalawi et al., develop a framework to 
construct a water distribution system [1]. The testbed consists 
of SCADA components, including the Modbus/TPC slave and 
master, and the Modbus/TPC HNI server. Functioning 
together, the testbed employs the use of the dynamic link 
library (DLL) of EPANET to simulate the water flow within 
the system. The testbed combines the use of existing 
techniques to produce a novel testbed application. The system 
tested through a case study involving a DDoS attack to 
demonstrate that convincing data-construction is possible. 
Software-based simulation data, such as this approach, is often 
used to test theoretical cyber-security systems; however, data 
constructed through emulators is inherently lacking in realism 
and a hands-on learning experience is missed. 
In addition to the aforementioned water distribution testbed 
approach, there are several existing proposals for critical 
infrastructure testbed architectures, which focus on specific 
systems, such as electricity substations [17]. However, our 
long-term goal is not to constrain our testbed to a single role, 
but to adopt a modular approach; whereby new critical 
infrastructure roles can be integrated at a later stage. This 
would make it suitable and useful to a wider audience. 
Specifically, the proposed system focuses on a water 
distribution plant; however, the design is extendable and 
testbeds can be extended to incorporate other infrastructure 
types, such as an ecologically-aware power plant. 
This project provides research opportunities for the testing 
and development of security enhancements in a real-life 
scenario. As such, the aim of the research is to have a practical 
output; a fully working critical infrastructure testbed. The goal 
is to demonstrate the suitability of the datasets generated by 
the Micro-CI testbed, which can also provide a benchmark for 
future comparison against those created by industry-standard 
software. 
3. APPROACH 
The Micro-CI project addresses the lack of both access to 
experimental data and the hands-on experience needed to 
properly understand the challenges involved in an era of 
growing digital threats. As such, the intended output of this 
project is to support the construction of a bespoke bench-top 
testbed for data generation; consisting of a model critical 
infrastructure and control system. The testbed will be used for 
cyber-security research purposes and testing new experimental 
methods for enhancing the level of security in cyber-critical 
systems, specifically those under current exploration by the 
investigators. In this section, an outline of the architecture of 
the Micro-CI project is presented. 
A. System Design 
The design displayed below in Figure 2, presents a 
rudimentary water distribution plant. The specification is 
modest, meaning there is scope for future expansion; yet is 
sufficient in size to produce realistic infrastructure behaviour 
datasets for research purposes. As illustrated in the diagram, 
there are two reservoir tanks, which are fed by two pumps 
moving water from external sources. The remote terminal unit 
(RTU) is used to monitor the outgoing flow rate and water 
level, to dynamically adjust the pump speed ensuring adequate 
replenishment of the reservoir tanks. However, vulnerabilities 
exist in the system, meaning that it is possible for an external 
source to cut off the water supply or flood the reservoir tanks. 
This can be achieved by switching off or speeding up either of 
the pumps used to control the water flow. 
 
Figure 2. Water distribution plant testbed architecture 
B. Practical Micro-CI implementation 
The practical implementation of the testbed includes the 
following physical components: an Arduino Uno Rev. 3 as the 
RTU, two 12v peristaltic pumps as the water pumps, two 
liquid flow meters, two water level sensors, two amplification 
transistors, diodes, resistors and an LCD.  
In the schematics shown in Figure 3, potentiometer 
symbols have been used in place of sensors; this is due to the 
limited symbols available in the blueprint software. As the 
maximum output of the Arduino is only 5v, transistors 
amplify this to the 12v required by the pumps. Lastly, the 
diodes are used to ensure the current can only travel in one 
direction, thus preventing damage to the Arduino. The 
hardware specification used is modest, meaning there is scope 
for future expansion; yet is sufficient in size to produce 
realistic infrastructure behaviour datasets for research 
purposes. 
 
Figure 3. Physical wiring schematics 
The construction is displayed in Figure 4. For the purpose 
of this experiment, the Arduino board remains connected to a 
PC via a USB cable (although this could be replaced with a 
network connection for similar experiments). The system is 
also inactive. 
 
Figure 4. Testbed Construction 
Through this USB connection, a serial connection is 
established to supply a real-time data feed, which is recorded 
and preserved by the PC (as illustrated in Figure 3). The 
metrics collected in this instance include: Water level 
sensor1/2 readings, Flow meter1/2 readings and Pump1/2 
speeds. These readings are taken from each sensor every 0.25 
seconds (4Hz) and written to the serial data stream. 
To examine the quality of the data produced by the Micro-
CI implementation, a dataset was recorded over the period of 
1 hour. During this time, the testbed was operating under 
normal parameters (i.e. no cyber-attacks were present). 
Essentially, this means that the pump speeds are configured 
to slowly continue filling the tanks at a controlled speed until 
full (even if no water is being used) and to cover the current 
rate of water consumption (if possible). The outflow (water 
being consumed) is a randomly applied value within a specific 
range (to make usage patterns more realistic). In this instance, 
the water source pipe is 60% smaller than the outflow pipes, 
which allows for a more accurate representation and to enable 
water tank starvation in case of overload. A sample of the data 
collection process is displayed in Figure 5, which shows the 
Arduino Serial Monitor.  
 
Figure 5. Example Serial Data Stream 
The datasets produced by the testbed are evaluated in the 
following section, as a demonstration of their applicability in a 
critical infrastructure research setting. 
4. EVALUATION 
Similar to the SCADAVT project, this testbed is evaluated 
through the demonstration of a Distributed Denial of Service 
attack [1]. The effect of a DDoS attack in comparison with 
normal behaviour of the testbed is evaluated.  
A. Data Construction 
As such, for the first part of this case study, data for the 
water distribution plant is recorded whilst operating under 
normal conditions. This enables the building of a behavioural 
norm profile for the system. Within the testbed, during the 
DDoS attack, only intermittent readings from the sensors are 
received, forcing it to make drastic (and therefore 
uncharacteristic) changes to the pump speeds, rather than 
gradual as when operating normally.  
A small sample of the data obtained at 00:10.5 in run time 
is shown in Table 1. There is no significant variation present 
in the data. All the metrics maintain consistent trends in 
operation.  
Within Table 1, C1 to C6 denote the system components 
used for data collection. As such, C1 and C2 denote the water 
level in tank 1 and 2 correspondingly; C3 and C4 signify the 
water levels in tank 2 and 3; C4 represents the water flow 
from tank 2; C5 denotes the speed of pump 1 and C6 indicates 
the speed of pump 2. 
Table 1. Normal Physical testbed Data Sample 
Sample(t) C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
00:10.5 65.0 69.9 47.3 55.4 81.9 85.1 
00:10.7 65.0 69.9 39.4 48.5 74.1 78.8 
00:11.0 65.0 69.9 39.4 53.4 74.1 83.1 
Table 2 represents the distribution of values for each of the 
components over the 1 hour simulation. The unique value, 
max, min, median, mean and standard deviation of the values 
are demonstrated. 
Table 2. Distribution Values for Normal Data 
Assessment C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
unique (est.) 23.00 4.00 55.00 52.00 51.00 53.00 
min: 65.00 69.99 34.82 44.86 68.91 74.83 
max: 66.14 70.19 38.19 47.96 72.91 77.92 
median: 65.59 70.09 36.86 46.69 71.30 76.64 
mean: 65.58 70.07 36.72 46.54 71.14 76.50 
std: 0.328 0.063 0.691 0.694 0.772 0.695 
B. Attack Data Construction 
The DDoS attack on the system, which is launched against 
the RTU’s communications channel, results in intermittent 
sensor readings. Whilst no new values are readily available, 
the RTU continues to maintain the previous pump speed. As 
before, Table 3 represents the distribution of values for each 
of the components over the 1 hour simulation during the 
cyber-attack scenario. The unique value, max, min, median, 
mean and standard deviation of the values are again 
demonstrated. 
Table 3. Distribution Values for Attack Data 
Assessment C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
unique (est.) 25.00 7.00 52.00 51.00 58.00 59.00 
min: 65.00 69.89 34.91 44.69 56.42 56.84 
max: 66.18 70.02 38.16 47.98 85.05 91.45 
median: 65.69 69.99 36.86 46.69 71.64 75.51 
mean: 65.62 69.99 36.71 46.54 72.07 74.88 
std: 0.36 0.015 0.689 0.705 6.832 7.327 
Whilst under attack, the testbed continues to function, 
service is disrupted and the output is visible in the dataset 
constructed. For example, the min and max values from C5 
are considerably different. This change is data is identifiable 
in a visual comparison of the pump speeds.  
Figure 6 presents a two feature scatter plot of the normal 
and abnormal operation of the two testbed pumps. Pump 
speed 2 is displayed along the y-axis with pump speed 1 
detailed on the x-axis. 
 
Figure 6. Scatter Plot for Normal and Abnormal Operation of Pumps 
Variance can be seen in the clustering of the data. The 
colour indicates the grouping. The normal behaviour of pump 
shows a deviation in the operational speed to adjust for water 
flow changes and maintaining the water level in the tanks. 
This is displayed in the red circles, distributed throughout 
Figure 6. Within the attack data, the RTU’s communications 
channel is unable to maintain active communication the water 
levels meaning that pump 2 is unable to adjust efficiently to 
match the tank water levels. This is reflected in the small data 
cluster in the centre of Figure 6.  
C. Discussion 
Current anomaly detection systems function by identifying 
a deviation from established patterns within given datasets. 
For example, in the case of network security, algorithms 
compare network flow with historical flows and outliers in the 
datasets are subsequently identified. Threats are marked as an 
anomaly. Supervised learning algorithms are generally 
employed to learn about the threats and establish patterns of 
attack behaviour, which are labelled as signatures. This allows 
for the detection of novel attacks. Based on the above 
evaluation, we envision that this testbed would be ideal for 
training and research which focuses on anomaly and 
signature-based detection. Specifically, this testbed offers the 
following benefits: 
 Normal/Abnormal dataset construction: Normal datasets 
can be constructed to act at the established pattern of 
system behaviour. Abnormal dataset can be constructed 
to act as deviation from normal patterns of behaviour. 
This can allow for experimentation with novel detection 
algorithms. Both types of data are needed for the core 
functionality for how anomaly detection practice is done.  
 Diverse application: The testbed is applicable to a range 
of CI scenarios and cyber-attack types. The above 
evaluation focuses on DDoS on a water plant; however, 
Denial of Service, Signature Injection, are further 
examples of attack scenarios which can be implemented 
for dataset construction. The main components of the 
system, for example the pumps, can also be altered to 
change the CI infrastructure type.  
5. CONCLUSION 
As previously discussed, one of the aims of this project is to 
devise a testbed, which is suitable for cyber-security training 
and research. It is our belief that the use of real-life data is 
more suitable for cyber-security research, than that of 
simulation only. One of the most effective aspects of the 
Micro-CI testbed is its expandability; meaning that in future 
work the scale of the testbed can be expanded to incorporate 
additional components and sensors. 
However, as with all solutions, there are some drawbacks to 
our approach. The first is that the use of low cost hardware 
reduces the level of accuracy that can be achieved. For 
example, the Arduino Uno uses an ATMega microcontroller, 
which is only capable of recording 4-byte precision in double 
values. This can present problems if precision is a crucial part 
of the research being undertaken. However, this can be 
mitigated by purchasing more expensive hardware. Another 
limitation is that in comparison to simulation software, the 
practical approach may require a greater level of improvement 
to students’ skillsets (which is not a detrimental attribute), and 
a longer initial construction time, to accomplish a working 
implementation. 
One of the main challenges for governments around the 
globe is the need to improve the level of awareness for 
citizens and businesses about the threats that exist in 
cyberspace. The arrival of new information technologies has 
resulted in different types of criminal activities, which 
previously did not exist, with the potential to cause extensive 
damage to internal markets. 
Society is becoming increasingly reliant upon critical 
infrastructure systems, which is forcing them to become more 
accessible and interconnected, in a short space of time. When 
this is combined with the growing sophistication of cyber-
attacks, this poses a considerable physical and digital security 
threat. Hence, critical infrastructure security is a key area of 
much-needed research that is under-supported. We hope that 
Micro-CI will provide a cost-effective, yet realistically 
accurate tool for future cyber-security research and learning. 
In our future work, we will compare the results from Micro-CI 
against existing industry-specific simulation software. We will 
also make the datasets available for cyber-security and critical 
infrastructure research. In addition, the construction design 
and instructions will be made available to other researchers. 
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